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Abstract  
The study of relationships within networks has traditionally focused on concepts such as cooperation, 
collaboration and other forms of partnership (Brown & Keast 2003). The assumption has been that actors in a 
network have shared vision and are working together. This study tests that idea by using mixed methods and 
ethnography to examine 15 neighborhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans, and 71 of their 
relationships within policy networks. Contrary to our typical understanding of networks, neighborhood 
associations engage not just in partnership, but also in power struggles. When excluded from policy networks, 
neighborhood associations use creative coercion to ensure their voice is heard. Facing a power deficit, these 
associations look for informal levers to assert themselves into policy negotiation. The result is creative and 
coercive measures, such as co-opting elections, bribery, blackmail and what one neighborhood activist calls 
‘guerrilla warfare.’ These conflicts force a reconsideration of networks. Networks are not solely homes of 
collaborative action; they are also the location of sharp power struggles over priorities.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Provan and Kenis (2008) argue that in studying networks, academics focus on the volume of 
relationships and the outputs created by those links. They call for increased attention to the 
nature of relationships within networks. This paper focuses on these relationships, using post-
Katrina New Orleans as context for a series of case studies on neighborhood associations and 
their networks.1 In doing so, it radically transforms and redefines the typical conception of 
such relationships, moving beyond configurations such as Brown and Keast’s (2003) 
categorization of relationships as being collaborative, cooperative or coordinative. Brown and 
Keast’s classifications, and the broader literature on which they are built, fundamentally 
envision networks as working together. An in-depth look at policy networks in New Orleans 
                                                          
1 This research is part of a broader inquiry into these issues. 
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shows that this is not the case. Conflict is a key feature of networks, and conflict is a reaction 
to being excluded from them. New Orleans neighborhood associations are creatively coercive 
about joining networks. When they have little power or are actively excluded from such 
networks, they seek levers from outside the policy system. These creative tools are their 
‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985) and allow them a voice in matters critical to their locale. 
 
This reframes networks. No longer do networks serve only as partnerships to make policies 
more efficient. Instead, urban policy networks are the scene of community conflict made 
famous by Alinsky (1971). Creativity is critical to these conflicts; excluded neighborhoods 
enact strategies to increase involvement and voice. 
 
Literature 
Dahl (1961) famously asked ‘Who Governs?’ The use of the term governance has changed 
over time (Kooiman 1993) to include more actors in networks. The new governance literature 
highlights the roles of additional actors in policy networks. Network governance highlights 
the relationship between these new actors, particularly when they interact in informal, non-
hierarchical ways (Sørenson & Torfing 2005). Brown and Keast (2003) categorize the 
different types of relationships community groups within networks can have. These three 
core concepts (new governance, network governance, and relationship categories) set the 
stage for a more specific discussion of power and conflict with policy networks. 
 
Scholars claim that increasingly, ‘public policy is less of a governmental dictum and more of 
an ongoing negotiation among government and non-government actors (Katz & Mair, 1995; 
Castells, 1996; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Ornstein and Mann, 2000; Bingham et al, 
2005a; Blyth and Katz, 2005)’ (Crozier, 2008 p. 3). While Crozier makes an empirical claim, 
other scholars soften the claim arguing, ‘the idea of a sovereign state that governs society top-
down through laws, rules and detailed regulations has lost its grip and is being replaced by 
new ideas about a decentred governance based on interdependence, negotiation and trust’ 
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2005, pp. 195-196). Kooiman (1993) argues that the term ‘governance’ 
entered the literature in the 1990s. Stoker (1998, p. 17) notes this shift and argues that it no 
longer only refers to what government does, but to a broader process. Stoker (1998) is not 
alone in noticing this shift in the understanding of governance. Forrest (2003, p. 593) argues 
that governance has moved from ‘centrally steered’ to being ‘negotiated, multi-actor, 
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interorganizational relations that link together state and society’. Bogason and Musso (2006, 
p. 4) describe this new term as referring to ‘an analytic focus, emphasizing process rather 
than formal organization, with a gradual evolution to recognition of processes as networks’. 
 
Scholars working within the new governance paradigm look to sharpen the analytical 
understanding of what occurs when more actors are involved in policy networks. Network 
governance is directly derived from new governance, but includes a more formal definition 
and contains a number of theoretical insights and tools that make it applicable to the urban 
context. In particular, network governance stipulates that relationships between actors in 
networks be non-hierarchical and that the policy process be a negotiation. 
Jones et al. (1997) define network governance as patterns of interactions in exchange and 
relations and flows of resources between independent units. These two basic concepts, 
independence and relationships, are common in definitions of network governance. 
 
Network governance research spans multiple generations, from theoretical discussion, to 
examples of case studies, to understanding the democratic implications of non-hierarchical, 
negotiated networks (Torfing 2005). This work pushes that boundary, by extending beyond 
single case studies to look at a cornucopia of different examples of relationships between 
neighborhood associations and other organizations (from non-profits to elected officials) in 
post-Katrina New Orleans.  
 
Much of the discussion around community participation in network arrangements is 
contextualized by a need to decrease the costs of public services (see Rhodes 1996). This is a 
core theme in network governance literature, where Rhodes explicitly describes governance 
as being about New Public Management and Stoker (1998, p. 39) calls governance, ‘the 
acceptable face of spending cuts’. More recent research focuses on the benefits of using 
networks to provide social services (see Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). Brown and Keast 
(2003) take this discussion in another direction, shifting the focus away from efficiency and 
towards types of relationships. 
 
One understanding of networks argues that they increase the efficiency of social services 
through market mechanisms such as competition; this is an extension of the logic of new 
public management (Rhodes, 1996). But other scholars and politicians trumpet networks 
because of their collaborative power. In particular, Katz and Bradley’s Metro Revolution 
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(2013) focuses on how cities are not only distinct units but part of global networks. Locally, 
Katz and Bradley argue for cooperation between networks of suburban and urban 
municipalities. William Eggers and Stephen Goldsmith, the former mayor of Indianapolis and 
deputy mayor of New York City, make the same argument on an even more local scale in 
Governing by Networks (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004), arguing that the future of governance 
is in the management of local networks such as those that a city uses to provide its social 
services. Provan and Kenis (2008, p. 229) get to the heart of this line of thinking, claiming: 
 
‘The advantages of network coordination in both public and private sectors are 
considerable, including enhanced learning, more efficient use of resources, 
increased capacity to plan for and address complex problems, greater 
competitiveness, and better services for clients and customers’. 
 
Brown and Keast (2003) are a part of this second class of network theorists, who argue that 
working together provides new opportunities to improve efficiency. They classify 
relationships within these networks as the ‘3Cs’.2 These categories are cooperation, 
coordination and collaboration. The categories are based upon differing levels of partnership. 
Cooperation is the least formal of these configurations, featuring short, informal relationships 
(Hogue 1994; Cigler 2001; Lawson 2002) in which organizations share things such as 
information and space, but still have autonomy (Winer & Ray 1994; Cigler 2001; Mulford & 
Rogers 1982; Melavillee & Blank 1991). Coordination is also short-term, but involves 
additional planning and coordination (Mulford & Rogers 1982; Daka-Mulwana 1995; 
Lawson 2002, Litterer 1973, Lawson 2002). Finally, Brown and Keast (2003, p. 8) describe 
collaboration as ‘the most stable and long term’ relationship, with ‘comprehensive planning 
and well-defined communication channels.’  
 
The classification of the ‘3Cs’ in terms of working together harbors an implicit assumption 
that network governance is a viable strategy because partnership leads to more efficient 
outcomes. But in doing so, Brown and Keast ignore the possibility of power struggle and 
conflict within policy networks. In the urban context, there is a long history of conflict as part 
                                                          
2 Brown and Keast narrow the five categories of relationships from “informal, cooperative, coordination, 
collaborative and integrative” (Hogue 1994; Cigler 2001; Leutz 1999; and Szirom et al. 2002), and build upon 
the five companion ‘c words’ for integration used by Lawson (2002): co-location, communication, coordination, 
collaboration and convergence. Brown and Keast (2003) use the more recent consensus that has emerged (see 
Winer & Ray 1994; Konrad 1996 and Fine 2001) around the use of 3Cs: cooperation, coordination and 
collaboration. 
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of the toolkit for progress. That can be through social movements (Anyon 2005), 
neighborhood conflict (Arnold 1979), and community organizing (Alinsky 1971).  
 
Each of these examples refers to communities using policy networks as a way to gain power. 
In doing so, they reflect a movement in the philosophical understanding of power, from 
power of one person over another (Lukes 1974; Hunter 1969) to power of people (and 
organizations) over each other (Foucault 1978; Gaventa 2003). In the latter philosophical 
approaches, people and organizations can be interdependent; power does not have to be 
complete and dominant. Those in positions of weakness can still exert power over those in 
positions of strength (and those in positions of strength can, of course, exert power back over 
the weak).  
 
By discussing power in the context of urban policy networks, this study examines an aspect 
of the structure or agency debate (see Hayward & Lukes 2008), in which sources of power 
are seen to be systematic or individualistic. In one corner of that debate, authors have 
specifically looked at how ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985) over time, fuel resistance to 
power structures, or the ‘power of the powerless’ (Havel et al. 1985) in which rejecting 
symbols has a similar effect. But that discussion has not reached the discussion of networks, 
where networks are seen not as sites of power struggles but as opportunities for partnership 
and efficiency gains.  
 
This research provides a link between this philosophical arm of the study of power, the urban 
tradition of social movement, and community organizing. This research shows that 
neighborhoods in New Orleans not only find themselves in conflict over the construction and 
direction of networks, but also use specific strategies to address their power deficit.  
 
Methodology 
This research is part of a larger inquiry into the priorities and strategies of neighborhood 
associations in post-Katrina New Orleans. That study focuses on New Orleans as a result of 
the paucity of comparative examples in network governance as most studies focus on a single 
example of network governance. The post-Katrina New Orleans context provides an excellent 
example to compare and contrast multiple cases of network governance in which 
neighborhood associations join policy networks to pursue their objectives.  
22   Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.7, No.1, 2015 
 
On August 29th, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans. The resulting flood caused $60 
billion in damages (Birkland, 2006) and over 1,000 deaths. Just days before, the city called 
for a full evacuation. At the time, it was the largest evacuation in the country’s history. 
Eighty percent of the city flooded after the storm, as New Orleans, a city shaped like a bowl, 
filled up with water, endangering the lives of those who stayed. New Orleans lost not just 
lives, but key infrastructure, leaving the city with a series of policy decisions and controversy 
over who should make those decisions. For residents struggling to find a way to return to the 
city, neighborhood associations were a key way to stay connected and attempt to have a voice 
in the city’s recovery. 
 
Neighborhood associations have long been part of the discussion of the urban eco-system (De 
Tocqueville 1835; Arnold 1979), but they have taken on a particularly important role in the 
post-Katrina context (Ahlers & Hummel 2007; Chamblee-Wright 2008). After Hurricane 
Katrina, these organizations took on a variety of roles, some becoming watchdogs, some 
providing services to their residents, some engaging in fierce conflict with their elected 
officials or developers. In doing so, neighborhood associations became an ideal mechanism 
with which to study network governance. They clearly meet the theoretical criteria: they have 
no formal relationship with government or others in their networks, and they are an actor 
from outside the traditional sphere of government. New Orleans was forced to reexamine 
many of its public systems after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina; these neighborhood 
associations engaged in a wide range of activities in a wide range of networks, creating an 
almost unparalleled chance to study multiple cases of network governance.  
 
Doing so is not easy. Neighborhood associations are notoriously difficult to contact; 
information from city government indicated that neighborhood associations sometimes 
disappeared from the mayoral administration’s eye only to reappear a decade later. As a 
result, this study uses a mixed methods approach to attempt to triangulate these associations, 
their activities and their motives. These methods include: ethnography, survey, document 
analysis and interviews. 
 
The case for mixed methods research is rooted in both the difficulty of penetrating 
neighborhood-level processes and the tendency for non-profits to tailor their answers to their 
audience (Stablein 1996). Using multiple methods expanded access to these associations. The 
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methods built upon each other. Ethnography provided important context and allowed for a 
strategy of repeatedly showing up to build trust, which was built over three years of study, 
and approximately six months a year in the field. Ethnography also allowed for verification 
of claims in interviews. The survey, essentially a census conducted in collaboration with a 
now-defunct non-profit called City Works, established a baseline of organizations from 
which to draw a sample. That sample was stratified by income, ensuring that this study did 
not simply draw case studies from the strongest, most visible neighborhood associations as 
was often done after the storm (see Chamblee-Wright 2008; Ahlers & Hummel 2007).  
 
Participation rates for both the survey and the sample of neighborhood associations for 
document analysis and interviews were extremely high, in part due to process of the 
researcher becoming a familiar face in the region over a number of years. Participation in the 
survey was 65%, which would have been higher except many organizations from the 
sampling frame simply did not exist. Eighty-eight percent of associations selected for the 
second stage of the study chose to take part, by providing documents and engaging in 
interviews, with 93% of potential interviewees participating.  
 
This second stage was characterized by a document analysis of each neighborhood 
association’s historical documents. These mostly consisted of meeting minutes, but 
association leaders helped strategize to provide comprehensive documentation where possible, 
including emails, flyers, blogs and other historical placeholders. The document analysis was 
conducted based upon Mayhew’s (2002) ‘action’ analysis. It also provided the foundation for 
interviews, allowing the study to go past associations’ talking points to discuss specific 
incidents in their history.  
 
Together these strategies combined to be what I call, A Methodology of Access. By 
combining ethnography, partnership with a local non-profit, document analysis and 
interviews, I gained access far beyond what was typical in post-Katrina study. Such access 
helped with rigor, as it allowed for a fuller picture that included hard-to-reach organizations 
and issues, and it also helped with depth, as I knew about and could ask about hundreds of 
issues for each association. 
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Findings 
In examining 71 different relationships in the context of 42 interviews with 14 neighborhood 
associations in New Orleans, neighborhood associations repeatedly found themselves 
excluded from, or in conflict with, a policy network. Lacking traditional power in these 
situations, they exhibited what I call creative coercion, using levers outside the system to 
help gain influence in their power struggles.  
 
Among the organizations I studied, there are myriad examples of conflict. Virtually every 
association that provided documents had evidence of exclusion and power struggles 
alongside the more traditional partnerships. Among these, three examples are the clearest 
examples of such conflicts, and display the broader pattern best. They show how 
neighborhood associations look for a creative lever outside the system, when they are 
excluded from networks. Their role in networks is not just as another group working together 
for a common goal, it is as an agitator, looking for a foothold to assure that their priorities are 
incorporated into the decision.  
 
In the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association, the former president explains her own 
struggle to protect her neighborhood from a proposed development of a grocery store. 
Historic Faubourg Lafayette is located in Central City, a historically African-American 
neighborhood in one of the most crime-ridden areas of New Orleans. The Historic Faubourg 
Lafayette Association opposed a proposed development in 1998 on several grounds. The first 
was the inappropriateness of the development. It was sprawling and suburban, with a large 
store and expansive parking lots. The opposition was also influenced by a desire for 
preservation. The development designs called for the demolition of eight historic homes.  
 
The racial implications of preservation were used by local City Council Representative Oliver 
Thomas to discredit the association. Oliver Thomas was a rising star in a political machine in 
Central City run by former City Council Representative, Jim Singleton. He was supported of 
the project, and it appeared that the developer had bought all the property necessary to start 
development. With little legal power and no financial resources, the Historic Faubourg 
Lafayette Association had no means to impact the debate. Oliver Thomas undercut support 
for the neighborhood association further by referencing a coalition between the association 
and primarily white preservationists. At a public meeting to discuss the development, Oliver 
Thomas criticized neighborhood protest as being supported by white preservationists who did 
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not live in the neighborhood. Although the president of the Historic Faubourg Lafayette 
Neighborhood Association was African-American, her association had only a few members. 
She reached out to the Felicity Street Redevelopment Project Inc., whose volunteers came 
from the nearby Garden District and were almost all white. Oliver Thomas used that fact 
against her. 
 
The neighborhood association lacked public support, money or legal influence. But it was not 
content to let the development of the grocery store continue. Working on a local tip, the 
association’s members discovered that one of the properties in the development area was still 
on the market. The developers only thought they had purchased it. This often occurs in 
relatively poor, African-American neighborhoods in New Orleans. Properties stay in the 
family for generations and paperwork is rarely up to date. As a result, developers believed 
they owned all the necessary properties and were caught unawares. Armed with information 
about the true owners of the home, the preservationist Felicity Street Redevelopment Project 
Inc. and the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association approached a second grocery store that 
was eager to spite the development as it had lost on its own bid to develop the grocery store. 
The association elicited a six-figure donation from the grocery chain, then used that money to 
purchase the home. Under cover of darkness, and worried that the developer would discover 
their plot, they met with the homeowner and purchased the property. 
 
The purchase slowed the development, and although it was eventually abandoned for other 
reasons, that purchase was considered to be a key moment in the policy process by 
interviewees from the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association and collaborative partner 
Felicity Street Redevelopment Project Inc. It also gave them a stake in a policy process from 
which the association was excluded, by leveraging resources considered by others to have 
been outside of the process. As the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association was excluded 
from the policy networks in its neighborhood, it grasped for another way to insert itself into 
the debate. It eventually took something extraneous, a donation from a rival developer and 
the purchase of a historic home affected, and used these things to insert itself into the policy 
network. This is what I call creative coercion. 
 
The Algiers Point Association followed that same pattern in a conflict with Crescent City 
Connection. The Algiers Point neighborhood is across the Mississippi River from the rest of 
New Orleans. Known as the West Bank, many of the neighborhood residents commute into 
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the downtown for work. Poorer residents often use the free ferry to cross into the French 
Quarter, where the tourism industry thrives and where they work at a variety of restaurants 
and stores. After Hurricane Katrina, the ferry service was suspended, and later opened with 
limited hours. This was an area of concern for residents of Algiers Point, as they found 
themselves stuck in the French Quarter because shifts ended after the ferry had closed for the 
night. As a result, many found themselves paying for taxis to return to their families after 
work, an added expense they could not afford. Neighborhood association meetings dealing 
with the ferry saw spiked attendance, and the association started an organization called 
Friends of the Ferry specifically to deal with the issue. 
 
Friends of the Ferry interacted primarily with an organization titled Crescent City Connection 
that was in charge of all travel between the West Bank and New Orleans. According to 
members of the Algiers Point Association, Crescent City Connection repeatedly stated that 
there was not enough demand to justify running the ferry late into the evening, a curious 
claim because the ferry was free and there was no monetary impact from running the ferry 
with few riders. Friends of the Ferry, with no legal say in the matter, had no way to impact 
this decision. Facing a power deficit, Friends of the Ferry set about creating its own influence. 
It made public records requests and sorted through the records of the Crescent City 
Connection. In these records it found that Crescent City Connection had broken a political 
promise made to the West Bank. Along with the ferry, the other primary manner in which 
residents commute to and from New Orleans is via a bridge. This bridge has a toll, and many 
residents of the West Bank are forced to pay it in both directions each day. West Bank 
residents were promised that the toll money from this bridge would be reinvested into 
transportation issues that affected the West Bank, such as repairs to the bridge and funding of 
the ferry. The Crescent City Connection records revealed that instead of keeping the funds 
from the toll local, they were being used to fund highway repairs on the LA-1, far to the west 
of Algiers Point. Friends of the Ferry took this information to State Senator Pat Connick and 
the state senator used the information to place political pressure on the Crescent City 
Connection causing Crescent City to change the policy and revert to the full complement of 
hours. 
 
Just as the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association aggressively inserted itself into a policy 
negotiation, the Algiers Point Association found creative and coercive ways to insert itself 
into the governance network. 
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A third example of creative coercion was the efforts of the president of the Northwest 
Carrollton Neighborhood Association. That president used a host of different creative 
techniques to be heard in different policy struggles. After Hurricane Katrina, the 
neighborhood association became involved in a conflict with a Walgreens pharmacy on a 
primary corner in the neighborhood. Similar to the development of the grocery store in 
Central City, the neighborhood association believed that the planned store model was too 
suburban and not respectful of the neighborhood and its history. The association engaged in a 
number of tactics to attempt to influence aspects of the development, from the direction the 
stores would face, to the look of the construction plans. At one point, it even engaged in what 
it cleverly called a ‘guerrilla warfare’ approach that involved hanging handmade signs from 
the construction that lamented, ‘Walgreens kills neighborhoods’. The association did deep 
research into the land use qualifications of the corner lot, finding that some of the plans were 
inconsistent with the legal requirements. Also, the association made the grocery store 
development an issue in an election. City Council candidate Shelly Midura included support 
of the neighborhood association against Walgreens as a plank of her platform in her 
campaign. When she was elected, she held a press conference in support of the Northwest 
Carrollton Neighborhood Association, which was cited as the turning point in the policy 
negotiations. 
 
Again here, the neighborhood association, which was excluded from all meaningful aspects 
of a decision with quite a large impact on the neighborhood, found a creative way to insert 
itself into the policy negotiation. In this case, research and legal approaches complemented a 
broadly political strategy. Both were designed to give the association power at the negotiating 
table. The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association received only minor concessions 
from Walgreens, but these included historically influenced designs as well as a shift in the 
back facade of the building so as not to screen out the neighborhood. 
 
That was not the last time that the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association was a 
thorn in the side of a policy network that sought to exclude them. Another critical issue after 
the storm was demolitions and blight. Mayor Ray Nagin and his administration asserted 
emergency powers for demolitions. The immediate problem was that damaged houses were 
collapsing, and causing other houses damage. But secondary problems emerged. Rumors of 
perfectly good houses being demolished without due process ripped through neighborhoods. 
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The mayor was caught in a scandal with the New Orleans Affordable Housing (NOAH) in 
which houses were claimed to be demolished that did not exist.  
 
The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association featured two avid preservationists as its 
leadership. One started a blog that took pictures of thousands of homes so there would be a 
record if they were demolished without cause. She also worked on the NOAH story, helping 
expose the corruption behind the demolition process. The other leader, according to an 
interview with another neighbor, took even more extreme action. The president of the 
association was dismayed not only at the demolitions, but also at the lack of a response from 
her neighbors. So one night, she bought spray paint, and painted the demolition sign on a 
number of neighborhood houses. The result was immediate; now her neighbors were invested.  
 
There were policy changes as a result of these creative and coercive measures. Emergency 
powers for demolitions were ended, and a board oversaw and approved demolitions. The 
leadership in the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association took an issue in which they 
were completely excluded, and had no formal authority, and inserted themselves into the 
discussion.  
 
The same thing was found all over New Orleans. The Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association 
opposed a land use measure by Dillard University to assure the university removed a program 
that placed ex-convicts in their neighborhood. The Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society 
used repeated police calls to attempt to protect their neighborhood from what they perceived 
to be a threat from a local apartment complex. The Upper Audubon Association used its 
political clout to oppose development by Tulane University that would have expanded 
student housing in their neighborhood. 
 
These different examples of creative coercion all follow a pattern. A neighborhood 
association is excluded. That association lacks traditional power, financing or decision-
making, so it searches for something outside the system. It then uses that creative, coercive 
technique to insert itself back into the process.  
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Conclusion 
The exclusion of neighborhood association in New Orleans policy networks and their ensuing 
conflicts, points out the need to reconsider these networks. Theory on networks, particularly 
within the work of Brown and Keast (2003) and network governance scholars (see Torfing 
2005), views networks as partnerships with the potential to increase efficiency. In this 
paradigm, if a group of actors join together for a common goal, they stand a better chance of 
succeeding. The experience of neighborhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans shows 
a different experience; there, policy networks are the location of power struggles. 
Neighborhood associations, faced with exclusion, use creative and coercive measures to 
insert themselves into these networks. 
 
The response to this exclusion by New Orleans’ neighborhood associations fits within a 
broader debate on the agency and structure of power. Neighborhood associations are clearly 
disadvantaged by the structure around them; they have little in terms of resources or formal 
legislative clout. In this way, they have much in common with Scott’s (1985) wielders of 
‘weapons of the weak’ or those with Havel’s ‘power of the powerless’ (Havel et al. 1985). In 
both these situations, the challenge is to have a modicum of influence despite little structural 
power. Similarly, how-to guides to urban activism and community organizing, such as 
Alinsky’s (1971) Rules for Radicals, provide a roadmap for asserting the same type of 
influence. Urban neighborhoods have long engaged in strategies to oppose development, 
fight for civil rights, or empower locals in politics.  
 
While none of this is new or unique to New Orleans, it is new to the broader theories around 
networks and connection. Castells (1997, p. 425) argues that, ‘The new power lies in the 
codes of information and in the images of representation around which societies organize 
their institutions, and people build their lives, and decide their behavior. The sites of this 
power are people's minds’. But this is an argument about the power of technology and media 
in uniting opposition, one Castells also makes in Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social 
Movements in the Internet Age (2013, p. 6) arguing, ‘This networking is operated by the act 
of communication’. Similarly, classic social capital arguments (see Putnam 1995) focus on 
connections between those in communities, not the power dynamics between them.  
 
So while the creative activity of neighborhood associations is not unique, it does make an 
important contribution to the understanding of networks. Specifically, these associations and 
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their conflicts illuminate a model of how urban neighborhoods address their structural power 
deficit in the context of networks. The contribution is in the incorporation of these conflicts 
and strategies into an understanding of network formation and negotiation.  
 
That model of how urban neighborhood associations work is called here, creative coercion. 
Cook (1972) coined the term, but this research both expands his concept and adds a strategic 
understanding to its use by grassroots and neighborhood organizations. While Cook sees 
coercion as morally neutral, he argues that coercion is creative when it is used for positive 
ends, often against the status quo. One example he gives is against racism in the South. 
Conrad (1974, p. 420) claims that this makes the term ‘creative coercion’ a rhetorical one, 
arguing ‘Was Stalin’s coercion of the kulaks ‘creative’? Was American bombing of North 
Vietnam ‘creative’? It is clear that Cook thinks of coercion as ‘creative’ when he agrees with 
its objectives’. This research redefines creativity within coercion to refer to not to moral 
direction, but to a specific pattern of strategies used by those less powerful against authorities. 
The research then catalogues the pattern of strategies used by neighborhood associations in 
New Orleans. 
 
The form of creative coercion established in this study, in which less powerful entities, here 
neighborhood associations, challenge more powerful authorities, has several characteristics. 
 
The first characteristic is that the neighborhood association is excluded from a network. 
Sometimes this means the association is not a part of the network at all, and at other times the 
association remains in the network but does not have the influence to affect final decisions. 
As discussed above, this is already a reconceptualization of networks as being the location of 
power struggles rather than primarily the location of partnership.  
 
The second characteristic of the creative coercion model is that neighborhood associations are 
at a structural power deficit; they have little money or formal decision-making power. This 
leaves them unable to use traditional strategies to leverage a spot within the network, or to 
influence the network.  
 
Finally, the third characteristic of the creative coercion model is that in response to this power 
deficit, neighborhood associations are forced to find and pull a lever from outside of the 
current policy debate to force others in the network to give them a seat at the table. While the 
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nature of innovation, creativity, and unexpected action make it difficult to make broad 
generalizations what these levers are, there are a number of levers commonly used. First, 
creative levers are often found by a small group of volunteers rather than wide unified action, 
a sharp delineation from Castells’ (2013) networks of outrage, which depend on greater 
numbers. Second, the creative action often involves the repurposing of a formal structure. For 
example, the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association repurposed an election to 
make it about a local development issue. The association also repurposed blighted buildings 
to promote their message (and physically, their signs) that ‘Walgreens kills neighborhoods.’ 
Other neighborhoods repurpose structure in similar ways.  
 
This creative coercion model draws from similar writing on community organizing tactics, 
but has a different purpose. Rather than provide a guide to community activists, it is an 
incorporation of power and agency theory into an understanding of networks. 
 
Thus, this article makes two contributions to our understandings of networks. First, it moves 
beyond current theorizing that networks are primarily partnerships to be used to create more 
efficient government, to a conception of networks as the location of power struggles. The 
article also uses the conflicts of neighborhood associations to build the creative coercive 
model, which shows specifically how long-standing community organizing tools are used to 
battle exclusion from networks, and to garner power within them despite structural deficits of 
power. 
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